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Although approximately half the states had dilution statutes,' Con-
gress, in 1995, passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA").2
* Professor of Law, University of Detroit-Mercy School of Law.
I. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
2. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127). The Act provides:
(c)(l) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against
another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use
begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection.
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider
factors such as, but not limited to -
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall
be entitled only to injunctive relief unless the person against whom the injunction is
sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of
the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous mark
shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 35(a) and 36, subject to the
discretion of the court and the principles of equity.
(3) The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register shall be a
complete bar to an action against that person, with respect to that mark, that is
brought by another person under the common law or a statute of a State and that
seeks to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of
advertisement.
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial
advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of
the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
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The act was designed to protect famous marks from unauthorized users'
attempts to trade on the marks' goodwill and thereby dilute their distinc-
tive quality.3 A federal statute was thought necessary for two reasons.
First, famous marks are commonly used on a nationwide basis and state
dilution provisions provided only "patch-quilt" protection.4 Under state
laws, inconsistent decision-making and a reluctance to grant nationwide
injunctions encouraged forum shopping and increased litigation. 5 Sec-
ond, Congress thought passage of the bill would be consistent with its
obligations under foreign agreements and would assist the executive
branch in negotiations with other countries to secure greater protection
for famous marks owned by United States companies.6
Although a dilution cause of action had the support of some,7
beginning with Professor Frank Schecter's seminal article,8 many more
commentators vocally denounced the need for a dilution cause of
action.9 To the critics, dilution law represented a theory "in search of a
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2002).
The term "dilution" is defined as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of -
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002).
3. Unlike traditional trademark infringement, dilution can be shown without proving a
likelihood of consumer confusion. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002). According to the legislative history,
Congress intended to cover both "dilution by blurring" and "dilution by tarnishment." See H.R.
REp. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995); CONG. REC. S19310-19311 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995), reprinted in
51 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 345 (Jan. 4, 1996) (Statement of Senator Hatch);
CONG REc. H14317 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1995), reprinted in 51 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 209 (Dec. 21 1995) (Statement of Rep. Moorhead). "Blurring" occurs when there is a
gradual "whittling away" of a mark's ability to serve as a unique and distinctive identifier because
of its use on other goods. See Frank Schecter, Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV.
L. REV. 813, 825 (1927). Examples of blurring uses of a mark include DUPONT shoes, BUICK
aspirin, and KODAK pianos. See H.R. REP. No.104-374, at 3 (1995). "Tarnishment" results
when a mark is employed in an unwholesome, unsavory or degrading context that tends to
undermine the positive images created by the mark holder. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini
Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Enjoy Cocaine" posters in a script and color
identical to the Coca-Cola trademark); Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1046 (S.D. Tex. 1998) ("Polo" mark used by defendant's "Polo Club" adult entertainment
business).
4. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal Dilution
Legislation, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 5 (2000); Kathleen McCabe, Note: Dilution-
By-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REv.
1827 (2000); Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark - Trade Identity
Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 618 (1976).
8. Schecter, supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of
Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948); Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws
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wrong."' 10 It was heavily criticized as unnecessary," improperly creat-
ing property rights in gross in a mark,' 2 and inconsistent with traditional
trademark law. ' 3
The conflicting views concerning the merits of a dilution cause of
action have been reflected in the judicial treatment of the federal statute.
There is general consensus that to prevail on a dilution claim a plaintiff
must show that (1) its mark is famous and distinctive; (2) the defen-
dant's mark was used in commerce; (3) the defendant's use was after the
plaintiff's mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use causes dilu-
tion of the plaintiff's mark. 14 Nonetheless, lower courts have vocifer-
ously disagreed about how these elements are satisfied.' 5 Perhaps the
Compatible With the National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269 (1985);
Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 789 (1997); William Marroletti, Note, Dilution, Confusion, or
Delusion? The Need For a Clear International Standard to Determine Trademark Dilution, 25
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 659 (1999); Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of
Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122 (1993); Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional
Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 827 (2000); David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REv. 531
(1991).
10. Klieger, supra note 9, at 810, 821; Kenneth L Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of
Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 443,
447 (1994). See also Moskin, supra note 9, at 122-25.
11. See, e.g., Jessica Littman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1722 (1999); Moskin, supra note 9, at 124; Welkowitz, supra note 9, at
533.
12. See Klieger, supra note 9, at 795, 817.
13. See id. at 795, 861, 865-66. See also Gerald N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable:
Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 966 (2001).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2002); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d
456, 466 (7th Cir. 2000); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999);
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998)
15. Among the issues upon which courts have split are (1) what constitutes fame. Compare
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that
fame in localized trading area is sufficient), with TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar
Communications Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2001) (improbable that Congress intended to grant
protection to marks famous only in a small area or segment of the nation), and I.P. Lund Trading
Aps. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 45-47 (1st Cir. 1998) (national renown is an important factor in
determining if rigorous standard for fame has been met). (2) Whether distinctiveness requires
"inherent distinctiveness." Compare TCPIP Holding Co., 244 F.3d at 98, and Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1999) (yes), with Avery Dennison Corp., Inc., 189
F.3d at 877 (no). (3) Whether trade dress is covered by the Act. Compare Planet Hollywood
(Region IV), Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815, 899-901 (N.D. I11. 1999) (no),
with Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 222-23 (yes). (4) Whether the Act can be applied to marks
adopted prior to enactment of the FTDA. Compare Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. OfficeMax, Inc.,
949 F. Supp. 409, 419 (E.D. Va. 1996) (improperly retroactive), with Westchester Media v. PRL
USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 669-70 n.l 1 (5th Cir. 2000) (not retroactive). (5) How a
plaintiff proves dilution. Compare Avery Dennison Corp., Inc., 189 F.3d at 879 (confusion not a
relevant factor), with Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 221 (confusion highly probative factor in
determining dilution).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
biggest dispute concerned what must be shown to prove that the defen-
dant's use diluted the plaintiffs mark. The Fourth Circuit, in Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of
Travel Development,16 held that dilution requires a showing of actual
economic harm. The Fifth Circuit followed that decision.1 7 In contrast,
the Second Circuit, in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 8 specifically
rejected the Fourth Circuit's standard, 9 finding that the plaintiff need
only demonstrate a likelihood of dilution to prevail on a dilution claim.2"
The Third, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have agreed with the Sec-
ond Circuit's approach.2" In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 22 the
Supreme Court finally addressed this circuit split. Given the value of
many trademarks23 and their function in the marketplace, 24 the Court's
resolution should have immediate consequences to businesses and con-
sumers nationwide.
Part II of this Article discusses the contrasting positions of propo-
nents of, and dissenters to, dilution theory. Knowledge of this debate is
necessary to fully understand the conflicting judicial interpretations of
the FTDA and to formulate appropriate doctrine. Part III presents the
conflict between the Ringling Bros. and Nabisco courts and describes
the Supreme Court's opinion in Moseley. Part IV provides an analysis
of the Court's decision and concludes that the Moseley opinion, although
not thoroughly reasoned, properly resolved the issue before the Court.
This part will present the reasoning absent from the opinion and will
address the issues that the Court freshly raised. Finally, Part V will sug-
gest a paradigm for proving dilution that best balances the competing
views about the merits of a dilution cause of action, furthers Congres-
sional intent, and is consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Moseley. This section also recommends a list of factors that lower
16. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
17. See Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Co., 238 F.3d 378, 380 (5th
Cir. 2001); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670-71 (5th Cir. 2000).
18. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
19. Id. at 223.
20. Id. at 224.
21. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd and
remanded, 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News,
L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1071 (2001); Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton,
189 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1999).
22. 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2003).
23. See Kurt Badenhausen, Blind Faith, FIN. WORLD, July 8, 1996, at 50 (estimating the value
of such brand names as "Marlboro," "Coca-Cola," and "McDonald's" at $44.6, 44.3 and 18.9
billion respectively).
24. Trademarks distinguish one seller's goods from another and assure a certain level of
quality. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 3:2 (4th ed. 2003).
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courts should consider when applying this paradigm and illustrates its
application.
II. THE MERITS OF A DILUTION CAUSE OF ACTION
A. Reasons for a Dilution Action
Use of a company's mark by others can cause significant private
harm. For many companies, the positive image associated with its mark
represents the company's greatest asset.25 As Justice Frankfurter
recognized:
If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase
goods by them.... The owner of a mark exploits this human propen-
sity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the mar-
ket with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the
means employed, the aim is the same - to convey through the mark,
in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity
upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner
has something of value.26
The power of images is why companies spend so much money test mar-
keting and advertising brand names.27 Does anyone doubt that a
woman's product called Maxi-pads will sell better than an identical
product named Gruk-pads? When others use a company's brand on
non-competing products, the image that the originator sought to estab-
lish often will be undermined. The non-competing product may be of
lesser quality or create dissonant images.28 In either case, the value of
the company's asset will be reduced.
A negative association does not have to exist to cause harm to the
mark holder. Junior uses of a trademark make the mark less distinctive.
One can easily pick out a flaming orange leaf in a pile of green leaves.
However, if the pile contains many flaming orange leaves, the original
leaf is no longer distinctive. Similarly, a trademark becomes less dis-
25. See supra note 23.
26. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
27. See Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for "Famous" Trademarks:
Anti-Competitive "Monopoly" or Earned "Property" Right?, 47 FLA. L. REV. 653, 711-13
(1995).
28. Tarnishment, where a mark is used in an unwholesome context, is the clearest instance of
harm from dissonant images. See, e.g., Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1046 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (use of Polo mark on adult entertainment business); Hasbro, Inc. v.
Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996) ("Candyland" mark
for children's board game used to identify sexually explicit internet site). Nonetheless, harm can
also result when a mark is used on a high-quality, wholesome product, that creates distinct images
that are inconsistent with the target market of the original brand. For example, Proctor and
Gamble might see sales of its diapers decline if the "Pampers" mark was used on a leading brand
of sandpaper. Cf Rose, supra note 27, at 712-13.
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tinctive when the marketplace contains the identical mark on many unre-
lated products. Not only does this harm the selling power of the mark,
29
but it also narrows the scope of the mark's protection from infringe-
ment.30  A strong mark with a high degree of distinctiveness is "pro-
tected against the use of similar marks on a wider range of goods or
services than are 'weak' designations that have less distinctiveness. '31
Third party uses of a mark are "relevant to show that the mark is rela-
tively weak."32
Whether or not the senior user's mark is damaged, adoption of its
mark by a junior user is a form of misappropriation.33 A junior user
does not adopt a truly famous mark by accident. An electronics manu-
facturer surely chooses Rolls Royce as a name out of the infinite uni-
verse of marks to "free-ride" upon the positive images that the senior
user created.34 Indeed, part of the value that a brand represents is the
ability to enter a new market cheaply and quickly.35 The senior user
expends substantial effort and dollars to create positive associations with
its brand. Under a Lockean "natural rights" theory, that should entitle
the senior user to reap the benefits of its efforts. 36 Even if the senior
user had no intention to extend into the new market, it should at least be
able to license use of the brand to someone so inclined. The inequity is
even greater when the reason the company has chosen not to expand
under its existing brand is fear that the harm to the core product from
brand stretching would outweigh the benefits of entry with name
29. See Moskin, supra note 9, at 136 ("Some empirical research has shown that the greater
the number of associations a word has . . . the more difficult it is for the individual initially to
encode the word in memory or later to recall the word." (citing J. Meyers-Levy, The Influence of a
Brand Name's Association Set Size and Word Frequency on Brand Memory, 16 J. OF CONSUMER
RES. 197 (1989))).
30. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999); Note, Dilution:
Trademark Infringement or Will-O-The-Wisp?, 77 HARV. L. REV. 520, 523 (1964).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. i (1995); see also MCCARTHY,
supra note 24, § 11:73.
32. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 11:88. Third party uses also are relevant to determining
whether a mark is famous, a threshold requirement for dilution protection. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(l)(G) (2002).
33. See Moskin, supra note 9, at 130; Welkowitz, supra note 9, at 584-85.
34. See Thane Int'l, Inc. v. TREK Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) ("the
animating concern of the dilution protection is that the user of the diluting mark appropriates or
free rides on the investment made by the trademark holder." (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002))); see also Boylan, supra note 7, at 27.
35. See Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks - From
Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 330 n.101 (1992) (citing ECONOMIST, May
5, 1990, at 77-79).
36. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 966 & n.26 (1993) ("The
Labour of one's Body and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his." (citing JOHN




The argument for a dilution cause of action is not limited to asser-
tions of private harm and moral outrage. There also are several dimen-
sions of public harm. First, to the extent that the senior user's image of
quality and satisfaction is damaged, the senior user loses some incentive
to maintain or improve upon its brand image. As a product's image can
be created both artificially and through the product's inherent qualities,
the public harm may be twofold. Consumers who take pleasure in hav-
ing an image-enhanced product lose some value and the senior user is, at
least to some extent, discouraged from maintaining the product's inher-
ent quality.38 Second, and typically ignored by courts and commenta-
tors, there can be several consumers who are actually confused. The
number of such persons may not rise to trademark law's traditional
threshold for likelihood of confusion, but confused they remain.39
Given the reduced scope of protection that results from multiple uses of
a mark,4 ° the number of such persons may be significant. In addition to
traditional confusion, there may exist what one commentator dubbed
"subliminal" confusion.4 Although the consumer, if asked, could dis-
tinguish the senior and junior users' marks as identifying different pro-
ducers, they may subconsciously draw associations between the two
users that lead to irrational decision-making with its concomitant private
and public harms.4 2 Finally, as Judge Posner argued, trademarks pro-
37. Cf. Drescher, supra note 35, at 330-331 nn.101 &102.
38. See Mark Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687, 1704 (1999).
39. It might be argued that if the law was concerned about minor levels of confusion, the
threshold for confusion should be lowered. Cf. Magliocca, supra note 13, at 981-82; Marroletti,
supra note 9, at 660 (all presenting the argument that traditional confusion analysis can protect
against worst harms from dilution); Moskin, supra note 9, at 143-45; Welkowitz, supra note 9, at
544. However, the risk of such an approach would be that the new reduced levels for confusion
would be applied in situations different than the typical dilution case. Cf Avery Dennison Corp.
v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999) ("by carefully limiting the class of trademark
eligible for dilution protection, Congress ... granted the most potent form of trademark protection
in a manner designed to minimize undue impact on other uses."). Dilution law requires that the
senior mark be truly famous and the junior user's mark be virtually identical, eliminating the case
of an innocent infringement. See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1750 (2003); Thane Int'l, Inc. v. TREK Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999); Jet Inc. v. Sewage
Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 425 (6th Cir. 1999). In a traditional trademark case, however, a
lowered confusion threshold would put the innocent infringer at risk, forcing junior user's to
undertake more elaborate and expensive searches.
40. See supra note 32.
41. See Rose, supra note 27, at 701-02.
42. One commentator has suggested that:
Experience reveals that sometimes even trivial characteristics of a person or an
object that evoke recall of negative or positive responses (or "affect") can lead to a
negative or positive evaluation of the new object. . . . Thus, if someone were to
2004]
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vide information to consumers. To the extent junior users adopt the
trademarks of others, the resultant "clutter" imposes real costs upon con-
sumers.4 3 This problem is exacerbated in the information age. To the
extent other companies use the same name, finding the senior user's
location on the World Wide Web can prove difficult."
Thus, the argument in favor of a dilution cause of action is simple.
Given the possibility of both private and public harm and the infinite
number of marks, it is reasonable to preclude a company from adopting
a mark virtually identical to a truly famous mark.
B. The Argument Against a Dilution Action
Many commentators question whether the proponents of dilution
relief have ever demonstrated that "a well-known mark is likely to lose
its notoriety because of its use on another's goods in the absence of
confusion."45 For example, numerous "Tiffany" establishments exist,
yet none have even come close to eclipsing the fame of Tiffany & Co.46
Rather, the Tiffany & Co. mark continues to thrive through the com-
pany's marketing efforts, the quality of the company's goods and its
enduring image.4 Indeed, one is hard-pressed to identify any truly
famous mark that is no longer famous because of use of the mark by
others. In many cases, the junior use, as a form of free advertising, may
actually enhance the value of the senior mark.48 Moreover, given mod-
em marketing and the expansion of the likelihood of confusion test, a
evaluate a particular brand name that evokes another name in memory, the potential
exists for evaluative associations to ensue.
Alexander F. Simonson, How and When Do Trademarks Dilute: A Behavioral Framework to
Judge "Likelihood" of Dilution, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 149, 160 (1993).
43. Judge Posner has stated:
A trademark seeks to economize on information costs by providing a compact,
memorable, and unambiguous identifier of a product or service. The economy is
less when, because the trademark has other associations, a person seeing it must
think for a moment before recognizing it as the mark of the product or service.
Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 67, 75 (1992); See also Ty, Inc.
v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1750 (2003); Lemley, supra
note 38, at 1704 n.90; Rose, supra note 27, at 697 n.166.
44. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998); Pinehurst,
Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431-33 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Magliocca, supra note 13, at 1032-
33. The new cyber squatting law does not fully address this problem. That statute only covers
persons who register domain names with a bad faith intent to profit from the mark. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (d)(I)(A) (2002). Once again, traditional confusion doctrine could be expanded. See
supra note 39; see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir.
2000) (discussing "initial interest confusion"). Nonetheless, expansion of traditional confusion
doctrine does not have the limitations imposed by dilution law. See supra note 39.
45. Welkowitz, supra note 9, at 539; accord Magliocca, supra note 13, at 981-982.
46. See Welkowitz, supra note 9, at 539.
47. See id. at 539.
48. See Moskin, supra note 9, at 135.
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junior use that did injure the senior mark would likely be held infringing
under traditional trademark law.49 Indeed, under state dilution law, very
few cases found dilution without also finding infringement.
50
Many critics view dilution law as inconsistent with traditional
trademark doctrine. 5' Historically, trademarks are protected not as a
property right, but to prevent consumer confusion and to maintain incen-
tives for product quality.5 2 Critics argue that neither rationale for pro-
tection applies in the case of dilution. A dilution cause of action is
relevant only in the absence of consumer confusion and independent
incentives exist to maintain a product's quality and image in the face of
a non-competing junior use.5 3 Whether or not a junior use exists, the
more the senior user increases its image or quality, the more goods it
will sell. Moreover, it is suggested that the junior user itself has the
incentive to ensure that the senior user's mark remains strong. 54 Other-
wise, the reference to the senior mark would provide little benefit to the
junior user. In short, critics claim that dilution law improperly creates
property rights "in gross," rights that even may conflict with the patent
and copyright clauses of the Constitution. Using the pejorative "free
rider" to label the junior user does not change that result.56
Critics also observe that the dilution cause of action is anomalous.57
Dilution statutes protect only those marks that are least in need of pro-
tection. Weak marks, struggling to establish their commercial identities,
are most vulnerable to being overwhelmed by non-competing junior
uses, yet such marks are not eligible for protection.58 The truly famous
marks that are protected are least likely to be harmed and most likely to
be protected under traditional trademark law.5 9
Opponents of dilution do not merely argue that the cause of action
49. See Klieger, supra note 9, at 809; Magliocca, supra note 13, at 981-82; Moskin, supra
note 9, at 128,143-44; Welkowitz supra note 9, at 544.
50. See Port, supra note 10, at 449; The United States Trademark Association Trademark
Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77
TRADEMARK REP. 375, 454-55 (1987).
51. See, e.g., Klieger, supra note 9, at 865-66; Welkowitz, supra note 9, at 532.
52. See, e.g., Klieger, supra note 9, at 865-66; Welkowitz, supra note 9, at 532; See also
MCCARTHY, supra note 24, §§ 3:8-3:9.
53. See Klieger, supra note 9, at 860-66; Magliocca, supra note 13, at 979-80.
54. See Klieger, supra note 9, at 827.
55. See Magliocca, supra note 13, at 981.
56. "Free riding" occurs all the time. For example, persons living near stadium venues may
sell parking spaces in their driveway. Obviously, they are free riding on the activity booked by
the stadium owner. Similarly, a person seeking to communicate does not have to invent her own
language, but can "free ride" on the work of earlier generations.
57. See Klieger, supra note 9, at 846; Magliocca, supra note 13, at 982; Welkowitz, supra
note 9, at 533, 539-40.
58. See supra note 57.
59. See id.
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is unnecessary, anomalous, or inconsistent with traditional trademark
principles. They also claim that the dilution cause of action creates sev-
eral affirmative harms that would not otherwise exist.60 First, a dilution
cause of action can eliminate the use of marks that have significant First
Amendment value.6' For example, in American Express Co. v. Vibra
Approved Laboratories Corp. ,62 despite the absence of confusion, the
defendant was enjoined from marketing its condoms, packaged to look
like the American Express credit card, with the slogan "don't leave
home without it." Similarly, a court prohibited a manufacturer of a com-
bined floor wax and insecticide product from using a parody of
Budweiser's slogan ("where there's life, there's bugs") to sell its ser-
vices.63  Dilution law also might prohibit expressive uses for a mark
such as a company calling its product "the Rolls Royce of air condition-
ers." Second, by protecting trademark rights "in gross," critics argue
that dilution law encourages inefficient persuasive advertising.' 4 The
resulting artificial brand preference, together with the possibility of dilu-
tion suits, can reduce competition by creating barriers to entry for
smaller firms.65 Third, dilution law will increase search costs. A com-
pany adopting a new mark must eschew existing marks in all product
and service markets.66 Finally, by creating a cause of action where none
existed, as well as adding an additional claim to traditional trademark
actions, dilution law increases the costs of litigation to both the parties
and the judicial system.
C. A Response to the Critics
While the critics of dilution are correct that few, if any, famous
marks have lost all distinctiveness because of a non-competing junior
60. See, e.g., Brown supra note 9, at 1191-94; Klieger, supra note 9, at 853, 856-60;
Magliocca, supra note 13, at 980-81.
61. Although the First Amendment doesn't protect misleading commercial speech, a dilution
cause of action does not depend upon any showing of misrepresentation or confusion. See
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Of course, non-commercial speech is exempted from the
Act's coverage. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B), (C).
62. 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
63. See Chemical Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962).
Although the lower court found confusion, the appeals court held that an injunction was justified
whether or not there was confusion. Id.
64. See Brown supra note 9, at 1190; Klieger, supra note 9, at 853, 856-60; Magliocca, supra
note 13, at 980-81.
65. See Thane Int'l, Inc. v. TREK Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); Klieger, supra
note 9, at 853, 856-60; Magliocca, suora note 13, at 981; Welkowitz, supra note 9, at 584.
66. This may not be a problem if dilution law protects only "truly famous" marks. However,
not all cases so limit the scope of dilution. See, e.g., Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc.,
934 F. Supp. 688 (D. Md. 1996) (fame in several counties is sufficient for protection).
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user,67 their argument does not address the problem of reduced distinc-
tiveness. Although still famous, a mark may lose value from use by
others on non-competing products.68 There is little reason to require the
magnitude of harm to reach the level of devastation before relief is
granted. It is true that in some cases a junior use may actually enhance
the value of the senior mark,69 either because it constitutes a form of free
advertising or has developed a reputation for quality. However, the
number of such cases is probably small and denying relief would mean
the senior user would lose control of its reputation and have to rely on
the junior user to continue offering a quality product or service. In any
event, damages would not be available if the value of the mark is
increased and a court could consider evidence of enhanced value when
considering equitable relief.
The argument that a dilution cause of action is unnecessary to pre-
serve incentives for image enhancement and product quality7" similarly
ignores incremental differences. Proponents of dilution do not suggest
that all incentives for product quality or image enhancement will be
destroyed by a junior use of the mark. Rather, to the extent that a junior
use removes value from the senior mark, the incentive for investing in
that value is concomitantly diminished.7' It is no answer that the junior
user benefits more to the extent the senior user's mark remains strong.72
Although likely true, the junior user may be willing to sacrifice some of
the senior mark's reputation if it means significantly increased profits to
the junior user. This is most evident in the case of the "quick shot artist"
who markets an inferior or unwholesome product. The reputation of the
senior mark may be diminished, but it is a cost the junior user is happy
67. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 28-32, 37-44 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
71. To those who question whether encouraging investment in product image (i.e.,
advertising) is worthwhile, see supra note 64 and accompanying text, there are several answers.
First, advertising often "communicate[s] useful information to consumers, and thereby reduce[s]
consumer search costs." Lemley, supra note 38, at 1690; George J. Stigler, The Economics of
Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 220-24 (1961). Second, advertising by a famous company is
only profitable if the consumer purchases the product and can rely on the quality and features
advertised. See Rose, supra note 27, at 711 n.205. In this sense, even image (as opposed to
informational) advertising has a "signaling" function. In effect, it tells the consumer, "[w]e
advertise, and therefore we must sell a good of sufficiently high quality that we can afford this
high-cost expenditure." Lemley, supra note 38, at 1690. Third, even if one believed image
advertising was inefficient, the cost of distinguishing between image and information advertising
would be too high to justify the effort, particularly given the frequency that an advertisement has
elements of both. Finally, there is the normative question, if the value of a product to a consumer
is the result of "artificial" brand preferences, is that value any less real? Generally, in a free
market economy, the choice of what to value is left to the consumer. Id.
72. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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to bear given its immediate and possibly significant short-run profits.
Similarly, legitimate ongoing enterprises may be willing to sacrifice
some of the senior mark's value if the result is more people willing to try
the junior user's product. In short, the junior user cannot be counted on
to properly balance the harms and benefits of the junior use when it
retains all of the direct benefits from the mark's use and only indirectly
suffers some of the harm.
In some sense it may seem anomalous that dilution protects only
famous marks, the ones least likely to need protection.73 However, the
requirement of fame can be justified, not based upon a presumption of
greater need," but as necessary to ensure that the costs of protection do
not become excessive. If a senior mark is not truly famous, a dilution
cause of action will significantly increase a new entrant's search costs
and may penalize innocent junior users.75 By contrast, a new entrant
presumably already knows about a truly famous mark and has only itself
to blame for costs resulting from an injunction against the mark's use.
Most of the affirmative harms identified by the critics also do not
require rejection of a dilution cause of action. The statute specifically
exempts fair use of a famous mark in comparative advertising or promo-
tion, all noncommercial uses of a mark and all forms of news reporting
and commentary.76 This should alleviate most of the critics' First
Amendment and competitive concerns. Furthermore, the typical dilution
case involves use by a non-competitor. Therefore, concerns about com-
petition generally are misplaced.77 Finally, search costs should not
increase if the statute is limited to truly famous marks.
This is not to say the critics' arguments are without any merit.
They merely are guilty of overselling their objections. Although real
harm may exist from dilution, if the federal statute was not afait accom-
pli, one might legitimately ask whether the extent of harm is worth the
intervention costs. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to identify any pre-fed-
eral dilution statute case where clear injury has not been remedied.
73. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
74. It is unclear which marks have the greatest need for dilution protection. Marks that are
not truly famous are most likely to have its public awareness eroded by a junior use. However,
truly famous marks have the greatest value to lose. Even a one percent loss of its mark's value
can cost millions of dollars. See supra note 23. Moreover, in the absence of dilution protection,
famous marks are the likeliest target for imitation by junior users. If a junior user is going to
appropriate a mark, it will want to adopt one that has the greatest name recognition and reputation
for quality. "Rolls Royce" toasters are likely to sell better than "John's" toasters.
75. Although the typical remedy in a dilution case is an injunction, damages are possible. See
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(2) (2002). Moreover, even an injunction can penalize the junior user by
causing it to lose some or all of its prior investment in its mark.
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2002).
77. In any event, competitive concerns can be considered a relevant contextual factor when
deciding whether dilution has been proven. See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
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Even in those jurisdictions without a state dilution provision, courts
often used traditional confusion analysis to replicate the result that a
dilution statute would yield.78 Nevertheless, Congress did enact a fed-
eral dilution statute and it is preferable to apply new law as opposed to
misshape existing doctrine. As a result, courts should not provide dis-
torted interpretations of the federal statute that effectively amend or even
repeal the Act.79 Rather, the Act should be construed in a manner that
best balances the competing interests while remaining consistent with
the language and intent of the statute.80
III. THE RELEVANT CASE LAW ON PROVING DILUTION
The conflicting views about the merits of a dilution cause of action
were nowhere more apparent than in the circuit split concerning what
must be proved to establish dilution. The Fourth Circuit, in Ringling
Bros.,8' indicating distaste for dilution theory,82 required a plaintiff to
prove actual economic harm to prevail under the statute. By contrast,
the Second Circuit, in Nabisco, 3 expressing less suspicion of a dilution
cause of action,84 required a plaintiff to demonstrate only that a junior
use created a likelihood of dilution. Those cases, as well as the Supreme
Court's resolution of the conflict in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 5 are summarized below.
A. Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development 6
Ringling Bros. ("Ringling") and its predecessors advertised and
presented their circus to the public as the "Greatest Show on Earth"
since 1872 and obtained federal registration for its mark in 1961.87 The
Utah Division of Travel Development, a state agency, began using the
78. See supra note 49.
79. Cf. TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001);
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. Of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d
449 (4th Cir. 1999).
80. See infra Parts IV and V.
81. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
82. The opinion refers to dilution as a "dauntingly elusive concept" for which it is "difficult to
identify the legal interest sought to be protected." Id. at 451, 456. The Court also endorses the
view of commentators that adoption of Professor Schecter's original dilution proposal would be
tantamount to creating "property rights in gross" in marks. Id. at 456.
83. 191 F.3d 208 (2d. Cir. 1999).
84. Id. at 217 ("The antidilution statutes rest on a judgment that the 'stimulant effect' of a
distinctive and well-known mark is a 'powerful selling tool' that deserves legal protection."(citing
RE.STATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrON § 25 cmt. c (1995))).
85. 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
86. 170 F.3d 449.
87. Id. at 451.
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"Greatest Snow on Earth" slogan to promote Utah tourism as early as
1962.88 It was used primarily on license plates, but also appeared in
winter advertising that had a $300,000 to $450,000 annual budget.89
The agency registered its mark in Utah in 1975 and received federal
registration, over Ringling's objection, in 1997.90 In 1996, Ringling
filed suit against Utah under the newly enacted federal dilution statute,
alleging dilution of its famous "Greatest Show" mark.9' The District
Court found for Utah, and the primary issue on appeal was whether
Ringling proved dilution by "blurring. 92
The Fourth Circuit concluded that (1) Ringling had to prove
"actual," not merely "a likelihood of," dilution, and (2) proof of actual
dilution under the Act required a showing that the economic value of the
mark was reduced.93 The court first reviewed the language and experi-
ence under state dilution statutes. The court observed that state statutes
and courts uniformly proscribed junior uses that created a mere "likeli-
hood of' dilution and, partly as a consequence of this speculative,
future-looking standard, failed to adequately define the exact harm that
dilution was designed to prevent. 94 Given this history, the Fourth Cir-
cuit reasoned that Congress's choice of the "causes dilution" language in
the FTDA necessarily implied that actual, consummated harm, not a
mere likelihood of harm, was proscribed by the Act.95 The Act's defini-
tion of dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services," the court further found, "makes
plain" that the Act seeks to protect the economic value of a mark's sell-
ing power, not just the mark's distinctiveness.96 The court specifically
rejected Ringling's argument that actual harm could be implied based
upon the substantial similarity of the marks.97 The court conceded that
its "stringent interpretation" would narrow the Act's scope 98 and admit-
ted that producing evidence to satisfy its standard may "tax the skills of
advocacy." 99 However, it believed that a lesser showing would be tanta-
mount to creating property rights in gross, and simply could not believe
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 451-52.
91. Id. at 452.
92. Id..




97. Id. at 459.
98. Id. at 458-59.
99. Id. at 460.
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Congress could have intended that result. 'I The court stated, if that had
been Congress' intention, it would have simply proscribed use of any
substantially replicating mark, not defined dilution as harm to the mark's
economic value in the form of lessening its capacity to identify and dis-
tinguish goods and services.'01 In the court's view, Congress was cor-
rect in requiring more than use of a substantially similar mark because
often junior uses do not affect, and sometimes even enhance, the value
of the existing mark.' 2 Thus, to prove dilution, the court required a
showing of actual harm through either (1) proof of an actual economic
loss of revenues and evidence disproving that the loss was caused by
reasons other than the replicating use, or (2) a "skillfully constructed
consumer survey designed not just to demonstrate 'mental association'
of the marks in isolation, but [to show] consumer impressions from
which actual harm and cause might rationally be inferred."' 0 3 Relevant
contextual factors could be used to "complement other proof."'"
B. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. 05
Pepperidge Farm produced and heavily advertised small orange
cheddar cheese-flavored crackers in the shape of a goldfish (the "gold-
fish" cracker) continuously since 1962."° It obtained numerous trade-
mark registrations for the goldfish design and name. 0 7  In 1998,
Nabisco, Inc. ("Nabisco") began selling animal-shaped cheese crackers
as part of a joint venture with Nickelodeon Television to promote the
network's "CatDog" cartoon.0 8 The Nabisco product contained crack-
ers in three shapes based on characters from the cartoon. 0 9 Pepperidge
Farms brought suit under the Federal Dilution Act because one quarter
100. Id. at 459.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 460.
103. Id. at 465 (citing Patrick M. Bible, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal
Dilution Trademark Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L.
Rav. 295, 327-28 (1998)). Under the survey method proposed by Mr. Bible to demonstrate
economic harm and causation, a single survey would be insufficient. Rather, multiple surveys
over time would be required to demonstrate a reduction in the brand equity of the mark holder
caused by the presence of the junior use. Bible, at 332. Ostensibly, the Fourth Circuit also would
require a plaintiff to supplement the survey with evidence eliminating other possible causes for the
reduction in brand equity. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. Of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999). Not surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit found
Ringling's survey, which was designed to demonstrate a mental association between the junior
and senior marks, inadequate. Id. at 463.
104. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465 (emphasis added).
105. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
106. Id. at 212-13.
107. Id. at 212.
108. Id. at 213.
109. Id.
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of Nabisco's crackers was in a fish design closely resembling Pepper-
idge Farm's goldfish cracker.110
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's preliminary injunc-
tion, finding that Pepperidge Farm had demonstrated a likelihood of suc-
cess on its dilution claim.' The court specifically rejected Nabisco's
Ringling Bros. based argument that dilution required documentation of
actual injury, consisting of an actual reduction in the senior mark's sell-
ing power." 2 The court believed the Fourth Circuit was guilty of
"excessive literalism to defeat the intent of the statute."" 3 Because the
statute permits only injunctive relief (absent willfulness), the court rea-
soned that waiting for actual injury would subject senior mark holders to
uncompensated injury and also preclude junior users from seeking
declaratory relief before investing in a product launch." I4 Accordingly,
the Second Circuit concluded that, despite its literal language, proof of a
likelihood of dilution was all that the Act required.' The court also
found the Fourth Circuit's requirement of "evidence of 'actual loss of
revenues"' or a "skillfully constructed consumer survey" to be an "arbi-
trary and unwarranted limitation on the methods of proof." ' 6 The court
reasoned that companies with growing revenues would never get relief,
and found consumer surveys to be "expensive, time-consuming and not
immune to manipulation."'"' Instead, the court held that "contextual
factors" should be used to prove dilution, just as they are used to prove
traditional trademark infringement." 1
8
Thus, the two Circuit Courts split not only about whether actual
injury needs to be proved under the FTDA, but also about the acceptable
methods of proving injury. The Supreme Court finally addressed this
110. Id.
111. Id. at 228-29.
112. Id. at 223-24. The court also rejected arguments that the statute did not apply to
competing products and that Nabisco's use of a fish was not a "trademark use" under the Act. Id.
at 222-23.
113. Id. at 224.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 224-25.
116. Id. at 223 (quoting Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div.
Of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 465 (4th Cir. 1999)).
117. Id. at 223-24.
118. Id. at 224. The ten non-exclusive factors the court considered to find that Nabisco's
cracker was likely to dilute the goldfish mark were (1) the mark's distinctiveness, (2) the
similarity of the marks, (3) the proximity the products and the likelihood of bridging the gap, (4)
the interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior mark, the similarity of the junior mark
and the proximity of the products, (5) shared consumers and geographical limitations, (6) the
sophistication of consumers, (7) evidence of actual confusion, (8) the adjectival or referential
quality of the junior use, (9) the harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user, and (10) the
effect of the senior user's prior laxity in protecting the mark. Id. at 217-22.
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circuit split in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 1 9
C. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. ("Victoria's Secret") owns the "Victoria's
Secret" registered trademark, operates over 750 Victoria's Secret linge-
rie stores and distributes 400 million copies of the Victoria's Secret cata-
logue.12° In 1998, the Moseleys opened a store named "Victor's
Secret," selling, among other things, adult videos, adult novelties and
lingerie. 2 ' Upon receiving a letter from Victoria's Secret requesting the
Moseleys to cease and desist from using the Victor's Secret name or any
variation thereof, the Moseleys changed the name of their store to
"Victor's Little Secret."' 22 Unsatisfied with the change, Victoria's
Secret filed suit for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and
dilution.'23
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court found
against Victoria's Secret on all but the dilution count.' 24 On the dilution
claim, the district court granted summary judgment to Victoria's Secret,
finding that the marks were sufficiently similar to cause dilution by
tarnishment. t25 The Court of Appeals affirmed the dilution ruling.'
26
The Sixth Circuit, defining the central issue as whether the FTDA
required proof of actual economic loss, rejected the Ringling Bros. test
and followed the Second Circuit's analysis in Nabisco. 27 The court
found it unnecessary to review all of the contextual factors suggested by
Nabisco, and concluded that this was "a classic instance of dilution by
tarnishing (associating the Victoria's Secret name with sex toys and
lewd coffee mugs) and by blurring (linking the chain with a single,
unauthorized establishment)."'
' 28
The Supreme Court held that the FTDA requires a showing of
actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution. 129 Nonetheless, it
rejected the Ringling Bros. interpretation that actual dilution required a
showing of loss of sales or profits. 3 ° The Court reversed the summary
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with
119. 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003).
120. Id. at 1119.
121. Id. at 1119-20.
122. Id. at 1119.
123. Id.
124. Id.. at 1120.
125. Id.
126. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 477 (6th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 466, 475-76.
128. Id. at 477.
129. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1124 (2003).
130. Id. at 1124.
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its opinion. 13
The Court began by reviewing the history of the dilution cause of
action. It noted that its origin was Professor Schecter's "seminal" arti-
cle, and emphasized that his original proposal was limited to the blurring
of arbitrary or fanciful marks. 132 The Court then found that the "contrast
between the state statutes and the federal statute, however, sheds light on
the precise question" before the Court. 13 3 In particular, the Court con-
trasted Congress's selection of the "causes dilution" language of the
FIDA with the "likelihood of' harm language of existing state statutes
and other sections of the Lanham Act. 134 The Court determined that this
phrasing "unambiguously" indicated that the FTDA required actual dilu-
tion.' 35 The Court noted that the "contrast between the initial reference
to an actual 'lessening of the capacity' of the mark and the later refer-
ence to a 'likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception' in the second
caveat" of the FTDA's definition of dilution 36 confirmed that actual
dilution was intended.' 37
Despite finding that the literal language of the statute required a
showing of actual dilution, the Court unequivocally rejected the Fourth
131. Id. at 1125.
132. Id. at 1122. The law divides marks into categories of "generally, increasing
distinctiveness," describing them as "(1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or
(5) fanciful." Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (citing Abercrombie
& Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)). Generic marks, which
describes a product class (e.g., a "thermos"), have no distinctiveness and are not entitled to
protection. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 768. Descriptive marks describe a characteristic of a
product or its quality (e.g., "Blue Ribbon" flour or "Honey Baked Ham") and receive protection
only upon a showing of secondary meaning (i.e. that consumers recognize the mark as identifying
a source of the goods). Id. at 767, 769. Suggestive marks are sufficiently abstract that an exercise
of imagination is required to identify a characteristic of the good or its quality (e.g., "Goliath"
pencils for wide diameter pencils). See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d
786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983). An arbitrary mark bears no relation to the product or service with which
it is associated (e.g., "Bumble Bee" tuna). See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 n. 12. A
fanciful mark is a coined term that has no meaning other than as an identification of source (e.g.,
"Xerox" copiers or "Kodak" cameras). Id. Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are said to be
"inherently distinctive" and require no showing of secondary meaning to receive trademark
protection. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.
The Supreme Court noted that Professor Schecter singled out arbitrary and fanciful marks for
protection from dilution because such words or phrases "had been 'added to rather than withdrawn
from the human vocabulary."' Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1122 (citing Frank I. Schecter, Rational
Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV. 813, 831 (1927)).
133. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124. The Court also opined that the contrast between state
statutes' express reference to both injury to business reputation and dilution of the distinctive
quality of a trademark and the federal statute's reference to only the latter raised the question
whether the FTDA covered dilution by tarnishment, a question the Court did not decide. Id. See
infra Section D for a discussion of this issue.
134. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124.
135. Id.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
137. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124.
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Circuit's requirement of proof of an actual loss of sales or profits. 38
However, the Court did agree that "at least where the marks at issue are
not identical," proof that consumers merely mentally associate the junior
and senior marks does not establish actionable dilution. 39 Rather, the
Act requires some evidence that the mental association reduces the
capacity of the famous mark to identify the goods of the owner. 4 ° The
Court indicated that such evidence might be established through con-
sumer surveys. 4 ' However, acknowledging that such surveys could be
expensive and unreliable, the Court said that actual dilution could also
be established through circumstantial evidence.'42 For example, simply
showing that the junior and senior marks are identical might establish
actual dilution. 4 3 Finding no evidence that the existence of Victor's
Little Secret had any impact on the associations created by the Victoria's
Secret mark, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings."'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MOSELEY DECISION
The Moseley decision provided much needed guidance on a number
of issues. The Court clearly states: (1) proof of actual economic loss is
not necessary to prevail under the FTDA; (2) a mere mental association
between the junior and senior user is not sufficient to prove dilution; and
(3) a consumer survey or circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
establish dilution. 4 5 As discussed below, this article agrees with the
Court's judgment on each of these issues, and provides some additional
justifications for the Court's position. The Court's opinion, however,
raises new questions about the FTDA's coverage of dilution by tarnish-
ment and the availability of injunctive relief prior to the use of a junior
mark. Those questions also will be addressed in this section.
A. Actual Economic Loss Need Not Be Proved - The Act Protects
a Mark's Uniqueness




141. Id. at 1125.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's opinion did not
preclude the availability of injunctive relief. Id. at 1126 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He reasoned
that the word "capacity" in the definition of dilution imports "both the present and the potential
power of the famous mark to identify and distinguish goods" and "[e]quity principles encourage
those who are injured to assert their rights promptly." Id. at 1125-26 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
145. See Moseley, 123 S. Ct. 1115.
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actual economic loss is required to prove dilution. Analysis of a statute
begins with its plain language. 146 Nothing in the statute compels a find-
ing of actual economic loss. Instead, the FTDA prohibits any use that
"causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark."' 14 7 Thus, the
harm protected against is a reduction of the mark's uniqueness or dis-
tinctiveness. The definition of dilution as the "lessening of the capacity
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services"
1 48
directly contradicts the Fourth Circuit's requirement of actual economic
harm.' 49 Indeed, given the incoherence that would result if the defini-
tion of dilution were substituted for the word "dilution" in the Act's
prohibitory provision, it seems reasonable to interpret "capacity to iden-
tify and distinguish goods or services" as synonymous with "distinctive
quality of the mark" or uniqueness.
The Fourth Circuit rejected this interpretation, in part, because it
believed such an interpretation would create property rights in gross in a
word, and assumed Congress could not have intended that result.
50
However, the proper interpretation of the statute does not create patent
type rights in a word. Not only is it impossible to assign one's rights to
the word absent sale of all or part of the business,' 5 ' but uses in the non-
trademark sense or that reinforce the recognition of the famous mark, as
well as all non-commercial uses, are allowed without permission or
charge.' 52 More fundamentally, the legislative history clearly indicates
that Congress did not intend to require a showing of actual economic
harm, but rather, intended that a loss of distinctiveness alone could
establish dilution. The House Report specifies that the FTDA applies
when an unauthorized use "reduces the public's perception that the mark
signifies something unique . . .,,5 It views dilution as an "infection"
that should be stopped before it spreads, not allowed to occur until
actual harm is proved. 54 The Report states that "the use of Dupont
shoes, Buick aspirin and Kodak pianos would be actionable."'' 55 It does
not say that such uses might be actionable if tangible harm could be
146. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2002). For the entire FTDA dilution section, see supra note 2.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002).
149. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
151. See Schecter, supra note 8, at 822; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1060, 1127 (definition of
trademark).
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (prohibiting commercial uses in commerce), (c)(4)
(exemptions).
153. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029.
154. Id. at 10, citing Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
155. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
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shown. Indeed, requiring a showing of economic harm would be incon-
sistent with the Act's stated purposes. 56 If economic harm was required
under the FTDA, plaintiffs would likely sue under state statutes, which
have not been interpreted to require a showing of actual economic harm.
The "patch-quilt system of protection" the Act was designed to remedy,
would remain. 157 Similarly, interpreting the Act in the limiting way sug-
gested by the Fourth Circuit would not "assist the executive branch in its
• . . negotiations with other countries to secure greater protection for
famous marks owned by U.S. companies."'
'I 8
Requiring proof of actual economic harm under the FTDA would
not only be inconsistent with its statutory language and legislative his-
tory, but it would be bad policy. Proving that a particular defendant
caused the plaintiffs economic loss would be next to impossible. If a
mark holder is unable to stop use of its mark before injury, several par-
ties may simultaneously infringe on the mark. How could the mark
holder show that any one in particular was responsible for its injury?
159
If the mark was on competing goods, the mark holder would be unable
to demonstrate that its loss was the result of dilution, as opposed to com-
petition.'6 ° Similarly, a mark holder also might have insurmountable
difficulties proving actual economic loss if its business experienced
growth during the period in question. Finally, as the Second Circuit
argued, a requirement of actual economic loss also would result in
uncompensated injury from non-willful violations. It would also pre-
clude a junior user from learning if its use would infringe until after it
invested appreciable funds in promoting its mark. 6' Moreover, to
require actual harm against the first junior user would be inconsistent
with the theory of dilution. "Like being stung by a hundred bees," the
injury from dilution "is caused by the cumulative effect, not by just one
use."'162 In short, the only policy favoring proof of actual economic loss
rather than a loss of distinctiveness is, as suggested earlier, a dislike for
the statute.'63
156. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
157. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
158. Id. at 4.
159. Multiple infringers might also make it more difficult for the mark holder to even establish
that its mark is famous. The statute lists third party uses as a factor in the famousness
determination. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(G) (2002).
160. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49 (1st Cir. 1998).
161. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
162. See MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24:94.
163. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. See also Brief for Petitioners at 18-20,
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003) (arguing that an economic loss
requirement is necessary because the FIDA "vastly expands" the rights of trademark owners and
creates the prospect of property "rights in gross").
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Although the Court unequivocally rejected the Fourth Circuit's
standard, 64 it did not expressly state that the FTDA, in part, was
designed to prevent the loss of a mark's uniqueness or distinctiveness.
Nonetheless, that is the only reasonable interpretation of the Moseley
opinion. The Court cites Professor Schecter's conclusion that the "pres-
ervation of uniqueness" is the only rational basis for trademark protec-
tion as the "seminal discussion of dilution" 165 and strongly implies that
mark identity alone would support a finding of dilution. 166 Identity
alone would not be actionable unless protection of a mark's distinctive-
ness or uniqueness was an important goal of the Act. Moreover, as
argued above, the statutory language and legislative history virtually
compel such an interpretation.
1 6
1
B. Mental Associations as Evidence of Dilution
The Court concludes that "at least where the marks ...are not
identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior
user's mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable
dilution."'168 This conclusion is unassailable. For example, many con-
sumers upon hearing or seeing Del Monte catsup may think of its domi-
nant competitor, Heinz ketchup. Yet no one would argue that Del
Monte weakens Heinz's capacity to identify and distinguish its goods.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that mental associations
have no place in a dilution action. The Supreme Court, alluding to the
facts in Ringling Bros., stated, "even though Utah drivers may be
reminded of the circus when they see a license plate referring to the
'greatest snow on earth,' it by no means follows that they will associate
'the greatest show on earth' with skiing or snow sports, or associate it
less strongly or exclusively with the circus."'' 69 Thus, for the Court, the
relevant mental associations are those raised upon hearing the senior
user's mark. If the consumer associates the famous mark with the junior
user or characteristics of the junior user's product, dilution under the
FTDA has occurred. The famous mark's ability "to identify and distin-
guish goods" has been lessened.'
70
164. See supra note 138.
165. See Moseley,123 S. Ct. at 1122.
166. See supra notes 142-43 and infra note 168 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 146-58 and accompanying text.
168. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124.
169. Id. at 1124-25.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002).
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C. Survey or Circumstantial Evidence May Be Used to
Prove Dilution
The Supreme Court's opinion in Moseley makes clear that dilution
requires that the famous mark actually suffer a lessened capacity to iden-
tify or distinguish goods or services 17" ' and that such lessened capacity
can be established by direct evidence, such as survey evidence designed
to demonstrate the mental associations raised by the senior user's
mark, 172 or by circumstantial evidence.1 73 These conclusions are easily
supported and have not been controversial outside the Fourth Circuit.
174
The first proposition follows from the definition of dilution.'7 5 The sec-
ond is little more than common sense. A well-formulated consumer sur-
vey can show that the senior mark calls to mind the junior user or
characteristics solely of the junior user.'7 6 As indicated earlier, such
mental association proves dilution. 7 7 It is equally clear that a consumer
survey should not be a prerequisite to relief. As the Court recognized,
consumer surveys can be expensive 78 and time consuming, particularly
given the number of litigable issues that survey methodology raises. 179
A survey, by inviting a respondent to think carefully about a mark, also
may underestimate the amount of blurring that actually occurs in the
marketplace, where consumers often are not quite so thoughtful. Cir-
cumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is used in virtually all types of
litigation, whether it involves torts, murder or traditional trademark
infringement. 80 There is no reason a dilution action should be treated
any differently.
D. Does the FTDA Protect Against Tarnishment?
The Moseley opinion raises doubt about whether the FTDA applies
to dilution by tarnishment. The Court observed that the petitioners
"have not disputed the relevance of tarnishment," but questioned
whether the concept was in fact embraced by the statutory text.' 8 ' The
Court reasoned that "the contrast between state statutes, which expressly
refer to both 'injury to business reputation' and to 'dilution of the dis-
171. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1125.
172. Id. at 1124-25.
173. Id. at 1125.
174. See Ringling Bros.-Bamrnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. Of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002).
176. See Bible, supra note 103 at 329-30.
177. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
178. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1125.
179. See Bible, supra note 103 at 316, 318-19.
180. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
181. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124.
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tinctive quality of a trade name or trademark,' and the federal statute
which refers only to the latter, arguably supports a narrower reading of
the FTDA."'182
The Court's dictum once again demonstrates the wisdom of avoid-
ing issues not addressed by the parties. The Court's suggested reading
of the statute is not compelled by the statutory language 83 and, as the
Court acknowledged, is contrary to the clear legislative intent.'8 4 How-
ever, the fundamental problem is that the Court's discussion is based
upon a misconception of the nature of tarnishment. The harm from
tarnishment, injury to reputation, is different (and greater) than the harm,
loss of distinctiveness, which results from blurring. However, the pro-
cess by which tarnishment occurs is no different than how the Court
describes the process of dilution by blurring. That is, for there to be any
reputation injury at all, prospective consumers exposed to the senior
mark must think of characteristics of the junior user. The prospective
consumer may associate the senior mark with characteristics of the jun-
ior user either because the marks have blurred or because the consumer
believes the senior user has sponsored or authorized the junior use. In
the latter case, the senior user could allege traditional trademark
infringement. 185 In the former situation, dilution has occurred. 186 Thus,
if dilution by blurring is covered by the Act, so too must dilution by
tarnishment.
182. Id. (citing Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 789 (1997).
183. Dilution is defined as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002). Webster's defines "distinguish" as,
"to mark as separate or different." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIA-E DICTIONARY 338 (1993).
Where the reputation of a mark has been injured, the mark no longer has the same ability to
distinguish or give prestige to the mark holder's goods or services. Justice Kennedy, in his
concurring opinion, left no doubt that he thought tarnishment was covered by the Act. Moseley,
123 S. Ct. at 1126 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
184. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1123; see also supra note 3.
185. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d.
Cir. 1979); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
186. In effect, tarnishment is merely the class of dilution or infringement cases in which courts
find a violation upon a lesser showing of proof typically because the harm is clearer and the
equities more one-sided. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836
(N.D. Cal. 1996); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy's Sportswear, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542
(N.D. Cal. 1996). Of course, if dilution by tarnishment is alleged, non-commercial uses will be
exempt. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2002); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894,
904-07 (9th Cir. 2002). By contrast, in confusion cases, some non-commercial uses have been
proscribed. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., 604 F.2d at 204-05; General Foods
Corp. v. Mellis, 203 U.S.PQ. (BNA) 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake
Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987) (first amendment protection greater for
diluting, as opposed to confusing uses), accord Mattel, 296 F.3d 894.
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E. Is Injunctive Relief Available Under the FTDA?
Justice Kennedy wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's
opinion did not foreclose injunctive relief.'87 He argued that the word
"capacity" in the definition of dilution imports into the dilution inquiry a
future as well as present ability to identify and distinguish goods.
t88
Unfortunately, this argument was the one forwarded by proponents of
the "likelihood of dilution" standard, 189 the standard expressly rejected
by the Court.' 9° Nonetheless, given that injunctive relief is designed to
"prevent future wrong, although no right has yet been violated,"'' and
preliminary relief only requires a "likelihood of success" on the mer-
its,192 a preliminary injunction might be available upon showing the
"probable consequences flowing from use or adoption" of a competing
mark. 193
Even if use of a junior mark is necessary to prove actual dilution
and get injunctive relief, there would be little practical consequences for
the parties. If the junior user did not invest a significant amount of
money in its mark, the senior user would be unlikely to learn about any
infringement until after the junior mark has been used anyway. On the
other hand, where the junior user does invest substantial resources in the
mark, the junior user would likely file an intent to use application for
registration to protect its investment.' 94 The senior user could then
oppose registration under the Trademark Amendments Act of 1999.'5
Moreover, in either case, a declaratory judgment action might be pur-
sued to have the parties' rights declared before use. 196 Thus, whether
recourse to the courts requires use or not, the Second Circuit's fear of
substantial uncompensated injury without a "likelihood of dilution"
standard' 97 appears misplaced.
187. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1126 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 1125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
189. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24:90; Brief of the American Bar Ass'n As
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct.
1115 (2003).
190. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1124.
191. Id. at 1126 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
192. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168 (2nd Cir. 2000); I. P.
Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 1998).
193. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1126 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
194. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2002).
195. Pub. L. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218 (1999). In opposition proceedings, the Trademark board
applies a "likelihood of dilution" standard. See Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) 1164 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2002).
197. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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V. RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE DILUTION
The critical question upon which the Court's opinion is noticeably
silent is: what are the relevant contextual factors a court should consider
as circumstantial evidence of dilution? The first part of this section pro-
poses a paradigm to help answer that question. Using that paradigm,
part two addresses the relevant contextual factors a court should con-
sider when determining whether a plaintiff has proved actual dilution.
Finally, the third part of this section will illustrate the application of the
proposed factors.
A. A Proposed Paradigm
In some cases, real harm may exist from dilution, either because the
junior use creates negative or dissonant images, results in traditional or
subliminal confusion or increases search costs.' 98 Nonetheless, it is also
true that in the majority of cases, the harm to the senior user probably is
at best marginal.' 99 Thus, as suggested earlier, one might legitimately
ask whether the extent of harm caused by dilution is worth the interven-
tion costs. 2° ° Nonetheless, one could just as reasonably conclude that
the possibility of even marginal private and public harm should create a
presumptive violation when a junior user, out of the infinite number of
possible marks, adopts a mark virtually identical to a truly famous mark,
at least where an injunctive order would be relatively cost-free. This
latter approach would be particularly desirable if it encouraged foreign
governments to expand protection against traditional trademark infringe-
ment of our domestic marks.20' It is this Article's view that this
approach was precisely the one taken by Congress, is fully consistent
with the Supreme Court's opinion in Moseley, and provides courts with
a principled way to apply the Act.
Under this approach, if a junior user adopts a mark identical to a
truly famous mark, harm should be presumed from the loss of the
mark's uniqueness. The junior user might overcome the presumption of
harm by challenging the assumptions underlying the proposed presump-
tion. For example, the junior user might allege that an injunction would
not be cost-free by demonstrating First Amendment or competitive con-
cerns, or good faith investment by the junior user. Alternatively, the
junior user might directly attack the presumption of harm by showing
198. See supra notes 28-32, 39-44 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
201. The desire to expand protection of domestic marks abroad could not alone inform
decision making because it knows of no limiting principle. That is, even absurdly broad
interpretations of the Act would further that Congressional purpose.
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that the senior user's prospective customers have no knowledge of the
junior user. If the junior user successfully rebutted the presumption of
harm, the burden should shift to the senior user to demonstrate more
than marginal harm in the particular case. This might be done with cir-
cumstantial evidence establishing that the junior use created negative or
dissonant images, confused some consumers, or increased search costs,
or by survey or more direct evidence of harm. The stronger the junior
user's rebuttal showing, the heavier the burden on the senior user to
demonstrate actual harm from dilution.2 °2 However, given the prohibi-
tion in the statute, where the interests of the senior and junior user are
equally balanced, a violation should be found.
If a junior user adopts a non-identical mark, the presumption of
harm should not be triggered unless the senior user convinces the court
that a significant number of consumers associate the senior mark with
the junior user or its goods. Contextual evidence such as virtual identity
of marks could be used to make this demonstration. Obviously, if the
senior user could not make that threshold demonstration, no violation
should be found. If such a showing is made, the junior user could pre-
sent rebuttal evidence as above. Again, the senior user would then have
the opportunity to respond with evidence of more than marginal harm.
However, in the case of non-identical marks, any showing of harm to the
senior user must be downgraded to the extent the marks' dissimilarity
causes more consumers to view the marks as distinct.
B. The Relevant Factors to Implement This Paradigm
This Article suggests that lower courts should consider the twelve
factors below when implementing the above described paradigm. The
factors suggested are designed to highlight the likely harms and benefits
from dilution relief. A multi-factored analysis may complicate litigation
and make outcomes unpredictable. 20 3 However, as the dilution provi-
sion incorporates equitable principles,2°4 a balancing of interests is a
202. A stronger showing of dilution either requires survey evidence showing that a higher
percentage of the public has blurred the two marks or evidence indicating that more contextual
factors or the strength of the contextual factors more clearly support the plaintiff than would
otherwise be sufficient to prove dilution. This is analogous to courts' treatment of "likelihood of
confusion" in traditional infringement actions. Where the equities favor the plaintiff, a weaker
showing of confusion will be accepted. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F.
Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPErIToN § 21 cmt.
a (1995) ("No mechanistic formula or list can set forth in advance the variety of factors that may
contribute to the particular marketing context" from which likelihood of confusion must be
determined); MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 23:1 (discussing the various levels of confusion found
to constitute infringement).
203. See MCCARTHY, supra note 24.
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(l) (2002).
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necessity. Courts have taken a multi-factor approach when deciding if
there is a likelihood of confusion under traditional trademark law. 5
There is no reason to believe that continuing this approach for dilution
will be any more difficult.
1) Similarity of the Marks
There is little question that the degree of similarity of the marks is
the most important factor for a court to consider. Unless the marks are
virtually identical, there is little reason to trigger the initial presumption
of harm suggested by the recommended paradigm. Indeed, where the
marks are too dissimilar, consumers would be unlikely to form any asso-
ciation between the junior and senior users' goods. Moreover, prohibit-
ing somewhat dissimilar marks would increase the costs to the junior
user when adopting a mark.2 °6 Thus, where marks are not virtually iden-
tical, no violation should be found unless the senior user shows that at
least some consumers associate the senior user's mark with the junior
user or its goods and the harm that results thereby is substantial.20 7
The Moseley opinion endorses this approach. If marks are identi-
cal, the Court is willing to imply dilution.20 8 However, it suggests that
where the marks are not identical, proof may be difficult to come by. 209
This may be the genius of the Court's opinion. The presumption created
from mark identity provides clear notice to junior users that they are at
risk if they adopt a famous mark. This should eliminate the need for
later litigation and simplify proceedings that do occur. The reduced
costs ultimately should be shared with the consumer. On the other hand,
suggesting that proof will be difficult in the case of nonidentity of marks
may discourage companies from bringing marginal suits. 210 This also
205. See, e.g., Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984); Frisch's
Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982); HMH Publ'g Co. v. Brincat,
504 F.2d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1974); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d
Cir. 1961).
206. Dissimilarity also might be relevant to show good faith. In that case, the junior user's
investment would be considered a countervailing consideration that would shift the burden of
proof to the senior user to show more than marginal harm.
207. For example, where tarnishment results, a court might be more inclined to find a violation
even where the marks are not virtually identical. See, e.g., Toys-R-Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Andy's Sportswear, Inc., 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
208. Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1125.
209. Id.
210. See, eg., K'Arsan Corp. v. Christian Dior Perfumes, Inc., No. 97-1867, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27658 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 1998) (not recommended for full-text publication) (local
cosmetics company claimed "K'Arsan Sun Powder" was infringed by Christian Dior's "Terra
Bella Poudre De Soleil Sun Powder"); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Market Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp.
2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Nat'l Distillers Prods. Co., LLC v. Refreshment Brands, Inc., 00 Civ.
No. 8418 (NRB), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13962 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2002); Binney & Smith v.
Rose Art Inds., 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 2000 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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will reduce costs and benefit consumers."' Not surprisingly, similarity
of marks was also a factor that pre-Moseley courts emphasized.
21 2
2) Likelihood That Differences Will Go Undetected
Even if two marks are not identical, if the differences between them
are likely to go unnoticed, the senior mark will no longer be perceived as
a unique identifier of the senior user's goods and the presumption of
harm should be triggered. Factors, besides the similarity of the marks,
that would be relevant to decide whether differences would go unnoticed
include the sophistication of the consumer, the expense of the goods,
and the length of exposure to the junior user's mark. The less sophisti-
cated the consumer, the cheaper the item, and the quicker the purchase,
the more likely similar marks would be viewed as identical.2"3
3) Strength of the Mark
Lower courts have agreed that the strength of the senior mark is a
relevant factor.21 4 Some have reasoned that the stronger the senior
mark, the more the mark holder has to lose.215 This may be true, but it
seems equally true that the weaker the mark the more susceptible it is to
dilution.2 6  The stronger rationale for considering the strength of the
mark is that the stronger the mark, the less harm will result from giving
it protection and the less likely the junior user is an innocent infringer.
A junior user may have some equitable claim to a very descriptive mark
such as BEST. That claim would undermine the paradigm's assumption
of an infinite number of suitable alternative marks. The same could not
be said if the junior user adopted a famous coined mark such as
XEROX. Nor would adoption of XEROX likely be by unwitting acci-
211. Given the less than overwhelming need for a dilution action a policymaker might be
tempted to simplify litigation still further by eliminating proof by contextual factors where marks
are not identical. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. However, such a rule would be
tantamount to requiring actual economic harm in all cases, the position rejected earlier, because
junior users too easily could change a single letter to avoid mark identity. See supra notes 146-63
and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Thane Int'l, Inc. v. TREK Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999); Jet Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419,
425 (6th Cir 1999).
213. The same factors should have no relevance when the marks are identical. In particular,
the sophistication of the consumer, although relevant to confusion, should not make blurring of
identical marks any more or less likely. Cf Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 220 (listing sophistication of
consumers as a relevant factor). If the marks are identical, the senior user's mark will no more be
a unique identifier of the senior user's goods for a discriminating, sophisticated consumer than it
will be for the "village idiot."
214. See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 469; Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217; Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy
Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 718, 736 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).
215. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt.
f (1995).
216. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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dent.2" 7 This was the reason Professor Schecter's original dilution pro-
posal was limited to arbitrary and fanciful marks. 18 As Schecter
explained, such marks are "added to rather than withdrawn from the
human vocabulary." ' 9 The Moseley Court's citation to Schecter and
this reasoning suggests that it too endorses the strength of mark
factor.22°
4) Awareness of the Junior Mark
If no consumer or prospective consumer of the senior user's goods
or services is aware of the junior mark, there can be no dilution.
221 Sim-
ilarly, the fewer the number of consumers aware, the less the harm.
Thus, if the senior user is a small restaurant in Macon, Georgia with the
name "Rise and Shine," it is unlikely that the opening of an unaffiliated
Rise and Shine store in Butte, Montana will cause the senior user much
harm. Although there might be a few people who travel to both cities,
given the amount invested in goodwill by the junior user, presumably in
good faith, the presumption of harm would be rebutted and the senior
user likely would be unable to make the then required showing of actual
harm.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to assume that an overlap of
consumers of the senior and junior user's products is required for dilu-
tion to occur.2 2 2 It is the mental associations of the consumers and pro-
spective consumers of the senior user's product that is relevant. Those
associations can be blurred by an awareness of the junior user, whether
or not there are cross-purchases. For example, if a greasy spoon with
the name Tiffany's opened on Fifth Avenue across the street from the
famous jewelry store, the capacity of Tiffany's to identify and distin-
guish its goods would be lessened whether or not its customers ate at the
restaurant.
5) Nature of the Junior Use
Several facts about the nature of the junior use should impact a
217. See also infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
218. See Schecter, supra note 8, at 828-30.
219. Id. at 829.
220. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2003).
221. Technically, under the definition of dilution, awareness of the senior and junior user's
marks by someone who is not a consumer or prospective consumer can cause dilution. See 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2002). However, in such a case, there would be no injury to the senior user's
business. Presumably, no court would be so literal as to find such "dilution" actionable.
222. The Second Circuit made the mistake of labeling the relevant factor as "the extent of
overlap among consumers of the senior user's products and the junior user's products." Nabisco,
Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir. 1999). Although the Second Circuit seemed to
later realize that it was enough if the senior user saw the junior user's product or publicity, not all
lower courts citing the "Nabisco factors" have done likewise. See, e.g., Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy
Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 718, 738 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).
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court's willingness to grant relief. First, if a senior mark is used in its
descriptive, as opposed to its trademark sense, the junior use does not
detract from the mark's uniqueness and should not be proscribed. Thus,
even if "American Airlines" is famous, a foreign company should be
able to refer to Northwest as an American airline without fear of a law-
suit. This principle has been recognized under traditional trademark
law22 3 and should also apply to dilution law.2" 4 Similarly, a junior use
that includes the senior mark to refer to the senior user or its product
should not be considered a violation of the Act. For example, a woman
who has appeared in Playboy magazine should be entitled to call herself
a Playboy Playmate of the Year.2 25 Alternatively, a car polish advertise-
ment showing a woman polishing a Porsche, prominently labeled as
such, should not be considered to dilute the Porsche mark.226 Such uses
typically strengthen, rather than blur, the senior mark. 2 27 Finally, a jun-
ior use, even if used to identify source, should be treated more leniently
if the mark is descriptive of the junior user's product. As the Second
Circuit suggested, the use of a fish design on competing cheese crackers
might blur Pepperidge Farm's fish mark, but the same design outside a
fish market might not.228 Not only would the use outside the fish market
cause fewer persons to form any mental association between the senior
and junior user, but the equities of the junior user 229 also would recom-
mend against a finding of dilution as once again the assumption of an
unlimited number of suitable alternative marks would be undermined.
On the other hand, a use of the senior mark as a web domain name might
be considered as strengthening the case of the senior user. In such cases,
not only is there likely to be dilution, but use as a domain name could
significantly increase consumer's search costs.
230
6) Confusion
Perhaps the most controversial contextual factor has proven to be
the presence or absence of consumer confusion. Courts and commenta-
tors have rejected consideration of this factor reasoning that "dilution is
223. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2002).
224. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 221; MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24:103.
225. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002).
226. But see Liquid Glass Enter., Inc. v. Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, 8 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. N.J.
1998) (finding a violation on the facts described in the text).
227. But see World Impressions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 235 F. Supp. 2d 831, 847 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (Stylized "Disneyland" mark on map to indicate the location of the amusement park found
to violate FrDA).
228. Nabisco, 191 F.3d 208
229. But cf Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000)
("Polo" magazine about the sport did not dilute Ralph Lauren's "Polo" mark and although
trademark infringement was found, case was remanded for disclaimer relief).
230. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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a separate legal theory positing a different kind of damage to a mark
caused by a different form of consumer perception."23' If a junior use
confuses a consumer about the source of goods, that consumer must per-
ceive the senior mark as identifying a unique source and hence the mark
cannot be blurred.232 While this has some truth, it takes too static a view
of confusion. Frequently, consumers who are confused at the time of
purchase later learn the true source of the goods they bought. At that
later time, the junior use may blur the senior mark. More fundamen-
tally, the argument against confusion as a factor in the dilution analysis
presupposes a uniform public perception. In the real world, a junior use
often will confuse some consumers and blur the senior mark for others.
Both are real harms that should be considered when deciding if the
senior user has shown sufficient actual harm to override any "counter-
vailing considerations" proffered by the junior user to rebut the pre-
sumption of harm. 33 This is true whether or not the number of
consumers confused alone rises to the level required for trademark
infringement.
2 34
7) Competing Goods/Competitive Effects
Professor McCarthy and the First and Seventh Circuits have criti-
cized consideration of the similarity of products as irrelevant to the dilu-
otion inquiry.2 35 It is certainly true that dilution can occur whether or not
goods compete; the statute specifies as much. 236 However, recognition
that goods compete will put courts on notice to inquire about the com-
petitive effects of a dilution action. Where goods compete, the dilution
action may be used to restrict legitimate competition. For example, a
generic mouthwash manufacturer may wish to use a similar trade dress
as the leading brand to ensure that consumers realize that the two prod-
ucts contain the same basic ingredients. As long as the generic's pack-
231. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 24:94.4, at 24-214 (4th ed. 2003); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d
456, 469 n.7 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting relevance of confusion); Avery Dennison Corp. v.
Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 879 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Matthew S. Voss, Berkeley Technology Law
Journal Annual Review of Law and Technology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 281 (2000);
Jonathan Mermin, Note, Interpreting the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: The Logic of
the Actual Dilution Requirement, 42 B.C. L. REV. 207, 233-34 (2000).
232. See Voss, supra note 231, at 281.
233. Of course, confusion is not required for a violation. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 221.
234. Case law suggests that a finding of likelihood of confusion requires approximately a
fifteen to twenty percent range of confusion. See Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 201 F.
Supp. 2d 335, 380 (D.N.J. 2002) (citing Gerald L. Ford, Dilution Surveys Update 1998, 537 PLI/
PAT 551, 562 (1998)).
235. See Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 468; I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49 (1st
Cir. 1998); MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24:94; accord Lynda J. Oswald, "Tarnishment" and
"Blurring" Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 255, 291
(1999).
236. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002).
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age or the store's shelves clearly indicate that the products are distinct,
there would be no consumer confusion. Nonetheless, a dilution action
might preclude such use. 2 3 7 Alternatively, a senior user might challenge
the mark of a competitor to increase the new rival's costs. 238 Both pos-
sibilities would decrease competition and result in higher prices to con-
sumers. The statute's equitable principles necessitate that a court
balance harms and benefits. Where competitive harm may be present, it
is appropriate for courts to demand a stronger showing of actual dilution.
8) First Amendment Considerations
There is no question that non-commercial uses of a mark, including
all forms of news reporting and commentary, are not covered by the
FTDA. 239  Equally true, commercial speech is entitled to limited First
Amendment protection. 24" Nonetheless, commercial speech does have
some protection.24' Courts interpreting the FTDA should ensure that the
Act does not unnecessarily eliminate the most expressive or entertaining
forms of such speech absent a stronger showing of dilution.242 The
clearest case for applying the statute narrowly, if at all, is where the
junior user's mark parodies the senior user.24 3 Not only does parody
237. A generic manufacturer could argue that his use of the senior user's trade dress was
exempt under the statute as comparative advertising or promotion. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 125(c)(4)(A). Whether a court would accept such an argument is uncertain. Cf Eli Lilly, 233
F.3d 456 ("Herbrozac," an herbal mood elevator, found to dilute "Prozac").
238. See generally Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and
Prof'l Publ'ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1553 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that monopolist's practice of
scheduling courses to conflict with competitor's courses could raise competitor's costs, and
therefore "would qualify as anticompetitive conduct"); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l
Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 368 (7th Cir. 1987) (when defendant "raised its rivals'
costs," it "raised the market price to its own advantage."); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C.
Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE
L.J. 209, 235-262 (1986).
239. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(4)(B) & (C) (2002).
240. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
241. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). The Court protects
commercial speech because it "is a matter of public interest that [economic] decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well-informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information
is indispensable." Id. at 366, citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
242. That is, First Amendment interests should be considered a countervailing factor that can
rebut the presumption of harm.
243. See, e.g., Chemical Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962) (Floor
wax and pesticide advertised as "where there's life.., there's bugs"); American Express Co. v.
Vibra Approved Lab. Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (condom in card
package advertised as "don't leave home without it"). Parody that is not part of commercial
advertising is fully protected under the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2002); Lucasfilm
Ltd. v. Media Market Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("Starballz"
pornographic movie didn't infringe "Star Wars" mark); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F.
Supp. 2d 1120, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Barbie Girl" song, despite sexual and degrading lyrics,
didn't infringe "Barbie" mark).
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implicate First Amendment values, but it "tends to increase public iden-
tification of a plaintiff's mark with the plaintiff."2 ' Indeed, the success
of the parody "depends upon the continued association of the mark with
the plaintiff. 24 5 For similar reasons, the dilution provision generally
should not apply to expressive uses of a mark such as the "Cadillac" of
refrigerators or the "Tiffany's" of costume jewelry.
9) Timing and Amount of Investment in the Junior Mark
Where a company has not yet used, or has invested little money in
its mark, an injunction requiring it to adopt another mark imposes little
burden. The amount of harm to the senior user that can justify inflicting
such a restraint correspondingly should be small. Conversely, where the
investment has been significant, and made in good faith, a stronger
showing of dilution should be required. The clearest case for demanding
a higher showing of harm is where the junior user's investment preceded
enactment of the FTDA. Although most courts have held that injunctive
relief under the FTDA against continuing uses does not constitute a ret-
roactive application of the statute," 6 the equities of the junior user obvi-
ously are much greater when, at the time of adoption, its mark was not
proscribed by the statute.247
10) Predatory Intent
For similar reasons, a defendant's predatory intent is a relevant fac-
tor when considering whether a plaintiff has made a sufficiently strong
showing of dilution to justify relief.248 Where the junior user knowingly
adopts an identical mark for no reason other than to free-ride on the
mark's goodwill, a court should disregard any consideration of the pri-
vate harm to the junior user that would result from an injunction. 249 In
such cases, the private harm was totally avoidable and the junior user
should not benefit from its bad faith conduct. Not only are the equities
244. Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 422
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), citing Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th
Cir. 1987) (internal citation omitted).
245. Id., citing Yankee Publ'g., Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citation omitted).
246. See, e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 669 n.l 1 (5th
Cir. 2000); Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 502 (2nd Cir. 2000);
Viacom, Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 1998); but see Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. OfficeMax, Inc. 949 F. Supp. 409, 419 (E.D. Va. 1996).
247. The junior user's mark, at the time of its adoption, may have violated statutes in half of
the states. See supra note I and accompanying text. However, those statutes were not
consistently enforced and, given the absence of dilution statutes in many states, many enforcing
courts were reluctant to issue nationwide injunctions. See H.R. REr. No. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
248. See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir. 1983).
249. The junior user could still rebut the presumption of harm from use of a virtually identical
mark if they demonstrate public harm such as First Amendment or competitive concerns.
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of the junior user small or nonexistent, no matter the size of its invest-
ment, but the junior user's intent suggests that an effect is reasonably
likely.25 ° Lowering the threshold for actual dilution in this situation also
comports with Congressional intent. The House Report describes the
Act as designed to "protect [against attempts] to trade upon the goodwill
and established renown" of famous marks.25' Moreover, the statutory
structure itself reveals Congress's awareness that the equities of the will-
ful infringer are negligible. Only willful violators are subject to dam-
ages under the Act.252 Of course, Congress's requirement of willfulness
for damages, with no similar requirement for injunctive relief, also indi-
cates that the absence of predatory intent should not preclude relief.
Even if the junior user did not seek to trade on the senior user's reputa-
tion, it presumably adopted its mark with knowledge of the senior user's
famous mark. 53
11) Senior User's Enforcement
If the senior user has delayed enforcement and allowed the junior
user to further invest in its mark, equitable considerations demand that
the senior user make a stronger showing of dilution to justify relief. Of
course, if the delay is sufficiently great, the equitable doctrine of laches
should preclude relief entirely. Also relevant is the senior user's laxity
in protecting its mark. Where the senior user has allowed third party
uses of its mark to go unchallenged, the defendant junior user reasonably
could have believed that its use was not objectionable. Again, in such a
case, the equities would demand a stronger showing of harm to justify
relief.
12) Negative/Positive Connotations Created by the Junior User
When a junior user tarnishes the image of the senior mark, the harm
250. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The fact
that one actively pursues an objective greatly increases the chances that the object will be
achieved ....").
251. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
252. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(2) (2002).
253. Despite a few early questionable cases, courts generally have required that a mark be
"truly prominent and renowned." See, e.g., Thane Int'l, Inc. v. TREK Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d
894, 911 (9th Cir. 2002) citing Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir.
1999); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 1998); WAWA, Inc. v.
Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1629 (BNA) (E.D. Pa. 1996) affd, 116 F.3d 471 (3rd Cir. 1997) (finding
WAWA famous); see also TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88,
99 (2d Cir. 2001); Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1164, 1181-82 (Trademark
Tr. & App.Bd. 2001). Even those courts that find niche market fame sufficient to satisfy the Act's
famousness condition require that the junior user be in the same niche market. See, e.g., Thane,
305 F.3d at 908-09; Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Co., 238 F.3d 378, 380
(5th Cir. 2001); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 164 (3d.
Cir. 2000); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999).
Thus, a case involving an innocent, unknowing infringer should rarely, if ever, occur.
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to the senior user is more concrete than it is for blurring. Thus, even
critics of dilution actions generally have acknowledged that there should
be relief for tamishment.2 54 Although the Supreme Court in Moseley
questioned whether tarnishment is covered by the Act,255 negative con-
notations created by the junior use should be considered when determin-
ing whether a plaintiff has proven dilution, even if tarnishment is not
recognized as a discrete action. Moseley indicated that the relevant
question, in a claim involving dilution by blurring, is what mental
associations are created by the senior mark.256 If characteristics of the
junior user's product are listed as traits represented by the senior mark,
dilution has occurred. Obviously, the more negative such traits, the
greater the harm to the senior mark, and the stronger the claim of equi-
ties for the senior user.257 Conversely, where the junior use evokes posi-
tive associations, such as an image for quality, the harm is less and a
stronger showing of dilution should be required. 8
C. Application of the Contextual Factors Illustrated
This Article does not suggest that the above twelve factors are an
exhaustive list of contextual factors relevant to prove dilution. Nor does
it suggest that a discussion of each and every factor is mandatory in any
given case. Rather, the Article views these factors as guidelines to help
courts analyze the harms and benefits from issuing an injunction so that
they can apply the earlier suggested paradigm. A few examples will
illustrate the envisioned process.
In Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd.,259 the defen-
dant used candyland.com as its domain name for a pornographic web
site. The plaintiff owner of the "Candyland" mark brought suit alleging
dilution. The court properly issued an injunction. The domain name
was identical to the plaintiff's famous mark, thereby triggering the pre-
sumption of harm. No countervailing consideration was present. The
use of the mark involved no competitive or First Amendment interests,
and the defendant's investment was not in good faith. Moreover, even if
the defendant did offer some countervailing consideration, 260 there was
254. See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 13, at 1018; Moskin, supra note 9, at 124, 146-47; Note,
Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O'-The Wisp?, 77 HARV. L. REv. 520, 522 (1964);
Oswald, supra note 236, at 279; Welkowitz, supra note 9, at 587-88;
255. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
257. See Note, supra note 254, at 522.
258. Id.
259. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
260. It might be argued that the investment was made before enactment of the FTDA and
therefore should be considered made in good faith. This argument lacks some strength because
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ample contextual evidence of actual harm. This was a use that created
negative connotations and was likely to increase search costs.
In contrast, the court probably reached the wrong result in Liquid
Glass Enterprises, Inc. v. Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG.26' The defendant,
a manufacturer of a car polish, created an advertisement showing a "pro-
vocatively-dressed" woman applying its polish to a Porsche 911 with the
Porsche trademark prominently displayed on the car.262 The court found
dilution and issued an injunction. Under the suggested paradigm, the
mark identity should create a presumption of harm. However, the defen-
dant could easily rebut that presumption. Porsche was being used in its
descriptive sense. The junior user could therefore assert First Amend-
ment interests as well as claim that its investment was made in good
faith. Moreover, the defendant could also challenge the presumption of
harm directly by asserting that its use was a reinforcing use that would
benefit the plaintiff. The car was portrayed among other expensive cars
in a manner that suggested its desirability. As the mark was not used on
another product, it is hard to see how the mark could lose its uniqueness.
The plaintiff did not respond with any evidence demonstrating harm
from dilution. Thus, an injunction based on dilution was not justified.263
As a final illustration, consider Moseley itself. Recall that the
defendants, Victor and Cathy Moseley, originally adopted the name
"Victor's Secret" for their store that sold lingerie, adult videos, sex toys
and other "adult novelties." Only upon receiving a cease and desist let-
ter, did they change the store's name to "Victor's Little Secret. 2 64
"Victor's Little Secret" should not be a violation of the Victoria's Secret
mark under this Article's proposed approach. The mark is sufficiently
dissimilar that no presumption of harm would arise. The plaintiff
offered no survey evidence showing that consumers associated the plain-
tiff s mark with the defendants or their goods, and the contextual factors
do not suggest that consumers would. The only part of the marks that is
identical is the word "secret," a very common word.265 The defendants
the State of Washington did have a dilution statute, and the investment was not shown to be
substantial. See Hasbro, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1480.
261. 8 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. N.J. 1998).
262. Id. at 399. The advertisement also showed the defendant's product being applied to
several other expensive cars. Id. at 400.
263. The court also found trademark infringement. Id. at 404. An analysis of that finding is
beyond the scope of this article. Normally, the presence of some confusion might justify finding a
violation of the FTDA upon a lesser showing of harm from dilution. See supra notes 233-34 and
accompanying text. However, in this case, there was no showing of harm from dilution.
264. The defendants, after the district court's order, changed their name to "Cathy's Little
Secret." See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 467-68 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd
and remanded 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003). The plaintiff had no objection to that name. Id. at 468.
265. Given Victor was the name of one of the defendants, coupled with the addition of the
word "little," this article would not presume predatory intent. Thus, there would be no reason to
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own only one store in Kentucky, so the majority of the plaintiffs con-
sumers would not even be familiar with defendants' mark. Those that
were familiar would likely notice the differences in the mark, as their
exposure to the defendants' mark would be at the defendants' store
where there would be ample time to notice the differences. Thus, plain-
tiff would not be able to establish a prima facie case and therefore it
would not be necessary to consider whether there are any countervailing
factors favoring the defendant. However, the defendants did not origi-
nally adopt "Victor's Little Secret," but first chose Victor's Secret and
"[t]he cases are legion which say that where there has been a cessation
of the conduct complained of, at any time prior to judgment, it is a mat-
ter for the exercise of the discretion of the court, as to whether an injunc-
tion should issue.
266
"Victor's Secret" should be found to dilute the "Victoria's Secret"
mark. Although the two marks are not identical, they are sufficiently
close that the presumption of harm probably should be triggered, partic-
ularly if a court found predatory intent. This Article would find such
intent, although a contrary finding has some support. The defendants
did claim to be unaware of the "Victoria's Secret" mark,2 67 and as indi-
cated above, their mark is just an amalgam of one of the defendants'
names and a very common word. Nonetheless, this author, who admit-
tedly has never been to Elizabethtown, Kentucky and did not hear the
Moseleys' testimony, finds the claim of lack of knowledge somewhat
incredible. Victoria's Secret had two stores within 60 miles of the
Moseleys, distributes 400 million copies of its catalogue each year,
seems to be at every major mall, and has a ubiquitous national advertis-
ing campaign, featuring scantily-clad beautiful women. This would
enter most people's awareness. Moreover, the similarity of marks
appears to be more than coincidence given that the defendant, like the
plaintiff, sells woman's lingerie and that the word "secret" does not
immediately or necessarily jump to mind when thinking of that product.
With the presumption of harm triggered, it would be necessary for the
defendants to present some countervailing considerations. This they
probably could not convincingly do. There are no apparent First
Amendment interests involved. Although the Moseleys might assert pri-
vate harm from the loss of goodwill, that harm should not be cognizable
given the finding of predatory intent and that their store was opened
lower the showing required to trigger the presumption of harm. See supra notes 249-53 and
accompanying text.
266. Ford Motor Co. v. Lapertosa, 126 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464 n.l (E.D. Mich. 2001), quoting
Parkway Baking Co., Inc. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1958); accord
American Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc. v. Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997).
267. See Moseley, 259 F.3d at 466-67 (6th Cir. 2001).
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after passage of the FTDA. The Moseleys might argue that the lawsuit
itself, much less an injunction, is a threat to competition.2 68 Although
the plaintiff and the defendants both sell lingerie, the competitive con-
cern should not carry much weight. Any harm to competition would be
limited. The Moseleys only own the Elizabethtown store, lingerie is
only a part of their inventory, and it is unclear whether consumers would
travel 60 miles to shop for lingerie. Additionally, if the market for lin-
gerie in Elizabethtown was already competitive, as it is in most cities,
any harm to the Moseleys would not result in harm to competition or
result in higher prices for consumers. Even if a court found some coun-
tervailing considerations favoring the defendant, the plaintiff could
establish more than just presumptive harm. The plaintiff would have a
strong case that in addition to dilution, numerous consumers likely
would be confused. 269 Also, as the Sixth Circuit found, use of the mark
by the Moseleys could tarnish the plaintiff's reputation. 70 In addition to
lingerie, the Moseleys sold adult videos, sex toys, and lewd coffee
mugs 271 that might be offensive to Victoria Secret's prospective custom-
ers. 272 Although Victoria's Secret does have risqu6 advertisements, that
is not the same as selling pornographic products and materials. Thus,
the court would have the discretion to issue an injunction.
As the above examples are designed to show, this Article's pro-
posed paradigm should make decision making easy in a number of situa-
tions. Of course, there still will be a number of cases where the result
remains unclear. After all, each case is highly fact specific and may
ultimately depend upon a balancing of non-quantifiable factors. None-
theless, even if the result is not perfectly predictable, the process should
be.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether a mark should be protected against dilution has been the
subject of intense debate. Proponents argue that use of a mark by others
268. Victor Moseley might claim he has a legitimate interest in using his name on his business.
Courts are sympathetic to such claims in traditional infringement actions. See Taylor Wine Co. v.
Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 569 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing cases). However, there does
not seem to be any corresponding interest in the use of the word "secret."
269. Indeed, a court would likely find a traditional trademark infringement violation. Not only
are the names virtually identical, but the only difference is in the gender of the first names. Given
that the defendant's store also carries male lingerie, some consumers probably would consider the
gender difference to be intentional and view the store as a subsidiary or licensee of the plaintiff.
See Moseley, 259 F.3d at 466.
270. Id. at 477.
271. See id. at 467, 477.
272. Unlike for the harm caused from confusion, any disclaimer relief could not alleviate this
injury.
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causes both private and public harm and results in unjust enrichment.
Opponents suggest that a dilution cause of action is unnecessary, anoma-
lous, inconsistent with traditional trademark principles, and creates more
harm than it remedies. This debate was not mooted by passage of the
FTDA. Rather, enactment merely shifted the debate from the legislative
to the judicial forum. In Moseley, the Supreme Court addressed what
evidence is necessary to prove dilution, the issue that had most divided
lower courts. The Court's rejection of a "likelihood of dilution" stan-
dard and requirement of "actual" dilution might initially suggest that the
critics of dilution theory prevailed. However, closer examination of the
Court's opinion reveals just the opposite. The opinion rejects a require-
ment of economic harm, permits actual dilution to be presumed from
mark identity, and allows proof by survey or contextual factors. Moreo-
ver, relief immediately upon use, if not prior to use, should be available
under the Court's opinion. Thus, the possibility of uncompensatable
harm, the reason lower courts adopted a "likelihood of dilution" stan-
dard in the first place,273 should not exist. Although the court failed to
elaborate on how one proves dilution by contextual factors, this Article
has suggested an approach that balances competing interests, furthers
congressional intent and is consistent with Moseley. Hopefully, lower
court judges will apply this model and achieve the consistency that was
sought by Congress,274 rather than continue to interpret the Act accord-
ing to their own predilections as to the merits of a dilution cause of
action.275
273. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 4-5.
275. Unfortunately, early interpretations of the Moseley case are not encouraging. Courts still
may be influenced by their views concerning the merits of the FTDA. Compare Nike, Inc. v.
Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (identity or virtual identity of
marks is sufficient to prove actual dilution after Moseley) with Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 68
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1893 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (mark identity alone does not prove dilution).
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